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[Crim. No. 6598.

In Bank.

May 13, 1960.]

In re WILLIAM EDMUND GROVES, on Habeas Corpus.
[1] Licenses--Power to License or Tax: Subjects.-Whether or
not state law has occupied the field of regulation, cities may
tax businf.'sses eal'l'ied on wit.hin their boundnl'ies and enforce
such taxes by requiring business licenses for revenue and by
criminal penalties. (Gov. Code, § 3710i.)
[2] ld.-Subjects-Practice of Profession.-The state can delegate
to a municipality the power to impose a tax for the privilege
of following the practice of a profession within the jurisdiction
of the municipality.
[3] ld. - Power to License or Tax - License Tax for Revenue. Where a city seeks to enforce its licensing ordinance against a
manufacturer and seller of ice cream products for revenue
only, such taxation is not excluded because the state has occupied the field of regulation.
[4] ld.-Power to License or Tax-License Tax for Revenue.-A
provision of a city ordinance precluding the application of the
criminal penalties provided therein, added to the ordinance to
make "it clear that the business fees imposed are for revenue
only," does not make lawful the earrying on of a business
without a license, dispense with the obligation to secure a
license, or exclude the application of the state criminal penalty
for carrying on a: business without a license required by law.
[5] ld.-Statutory Provisions.-Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16240, making it a misdemeanor for any person to carry on a business
or trade for which a license is required without taking out or
procuring the license required by law, was added to the code
when the Legislature repealed identical provisions of Pen. Code,
§ 435, at which time (1941) it was settled that a city ordinance
was a law of the state within the meaning of § 435. By transferring the statute from the Penal Code to the Business and
Professions Code, the Legislature did not change the meaning
of its terms. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 2.)
[1] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Licenses, §§ 7, 37 ct seq.; Am.Jur., Licenses,
§§ 7, 47.
Melt. Dig. References: [1] Licenses, §§ 3,21; [2] Licenses, § 26;
[3, 4] Licenses, § 7(2); [5] Licenses, § 5; [6] Habeas Corpus,
§ 22(11); [7] Licenses, § 12.
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[6] Habeas Corpus-Defective Accusatory Pleading-Complaint.Where a cOillplaint charging the operntnr of a "milk products
plant" with the mi,,;t!elll('anor of operating hi~ bllsine~s withuut
having first seeured a bu~iness license as l'('qnired by a city
ordinance stated. the precise facts made a lllisdemeanor. by
Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16240, such operator was fully informcd
of the charges against him and was in no way prejudiced hy
failure of the complaint to cite § 16240. Under such circumstances failure to cite the code section in the complaint was
not ground for setting aside the .iudgnl!~nt of conviction on
habeas corpus.
[7] Licenses-Va.lidity of Ordinances.-The operator of a "milk
products plant" could not successfully contend that it was a
denial of equal protection of the laws to enforce the criminal
penalties of a city ordinance against tho;;e not required to
have state licenses but not to enforce such penalties against
those required to have such licenses, where the penalties of the
ordinance have not been invoked against him, and Bus. &
Prof. Code, § 16240, whirh he violated, npplies equnlly to all
persons required. to have licenses.

PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from custody. Writ denied, and petitioner remanded to custody.
William O. Burt for Petitioner.
Jerome J. Bunker, City Attorney (Palm Springs), for Re·
spondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-By petition for a writ of habeas corpus
petitioner challenges his conviction of engaging ip business
in the city of Palm Springs without a license as required by
the Palm Springs Ordinance Code. \Ve issued an order to
show cause directed to the Chief of Police of Palm Springs
and ordered petitioner released on his own recognizance.
Petitioner secured a state lieense to operate a "milk products
plant" in Palm Springs for the manufacture and sale at retail
of ice cream products. (Agr. Code, §§ 660-661.) He contends
that the state statutes establish a complete system for the
licensing and regulation of his business and that the city
cannot therefore require him to secure an additional license
to conduct that business. The city contends that the state
statutes have not occupicd the field of regulation of businesses
such as petitioner's aud that in any event its licensing ordinance does not conflict with state regulatory laws, since as
applied to petitioner, the ordinance requires a business license
for rcvenue only.
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Chaptcl'S 21 and 22 of the Palm Springs Business License
Ordinance (division 2 of the Palm Springs Ordinance Code)
provide for the licensing of businesses and the payment of
business license fces hy those engaged in business in the city.
Section 2111 of chapter 21 provides that "It is unlawful
for any person (whether as owner, manager, principal, agent,
clerk, employee, officer or lessee, either for himself or for any
other person, or for any body corporate, or as an officer of
any corporation, or otherwise) to commence, manage, engage
in, conduct or carryon any business, vocation, profession,
calling, show, exhibition or game, in Chapters 21 and 22
specified, in this City, without first having procured a license
from the City of Palm Springs to do so or without first complying with any and all regulations for such business, vocation, profession, calling, show, exhibition or game contained
in Chapters 21 and 22." Section 2131 provides that no person
shall be licensed to carryon an activity requiring a state
license unless hc has such a license, section 2133 provides that
no person shall be licensed to carryon an activity requiring
a permit under some other city ordinance unless he has secured
such a permit, and section 2135 provides that no person shall
be licensed to carryon an activity at a place where the activity
is prohibited by a zoning ordiuance. Other provisions of
chapter 21 set forth the conditions on which the city council
may issue special permits for activities requiring such permits,
additional regulations applicable to peddlers and solicitors,
and remedies for enforcement of the licensing ordinance including the collection of the business license fees set forth in
chapter 22. The fee applicable to petitioner's business is
$100 per year.
Although the ordinance provides generally both for the
regulation of the businesses involved and the collection of revenue by business license fees, it has been invoked specifically
against petitioner solely for revenue purposes. Other than the
requirements with respect to state licenses and zoning, which
are not here involved, the ordinance contains no provisions
regulating the conduct of plaintiff's business.
[1] Whether or not state law has occupied the field of
regulatjon, cities may tax businesses carried on within their
boundaries and enforce such taxes by requiring business licenses for revenue and by criminal penalties. (Gov. Code,
§ 37101; In re Galusha, 184 Cal. 697, 699 [195 P. 406] ; Franklin v. Peterson, 87 Ca1.App.2d 721, 731 [197 P.2<l 788] ; City
of Satn Mateo v. Mullin, 59 Cal.App.2d 652,·654 [139 P.2d
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351] ; In re Johnson, 47 Cal.App. 465, 468 [HIO P. 852] ; s<'e
also Ainsworth v. Bryant, 34 Ca1.2d 465, 476 c·!"i7 [211 P.2<l
564] ; Horwith v. City of Frcsno, 74 Cal.App.2d 443, 445
[168 P.2d 767].) This court stated the applieable law when
it discharged a writ of habeas corpus sought by an attorn<'y
who had been arrested for carrying on the practice of law in
the city of Los Angeles without paying the license tax imposed
by a city ordinance. [2] "As in the case of other professions or businesses which can be taxed by the state, the cases
hold that the state can delegate to a municipality the power
to impose a tax for the privilege of following the practice of
the profession within the jurisdiction of the muuicipality.
[Citations.] The imposition of an occupational tax by a
municipality upon those engaged in the practice of the lcgal
profession is not an interference with state affairs. The
mere compliance with certain prerequisites, in return for which
a license to practice law is granted by the state, does not place
a person beyond the range of additional regulation of the
conditions upon which the license may be used. The municipality, in imposing an occupational tax upon attorneys, is not
interfering with state regulations, for it is not attempting to
prescribe qualifications for attorneys different from or additional to those prescribed by the state. It is merely proyiding .
for an increase in its revenue by imposing a tax upon those
who, by pursuing their profession within its limits, are deriving benefits from the advantages especially afforded by the
city. The tax is levied upon the business of practicing law,
rather than upon a person because he is an attorney at law.
[Citation.} A license to practice does not carry with it
exemptions from taxation." (In re Galusha, s1lpra.)
Petitioner contends, however, citing Agnew v. City of Los
Angeles, 51 Cal.2d 1 [330 P.2d 385}, Agnew v. City of Culver
City, 51 Ca1.2d 474 [334 P.2d 571], and Agnew v. City of Cul1)61" City, 147 Cal.App.2d 144 [304 P.2d 788], that city business taxes may not be enforced against persons licensed under
state law by requiring them to secure business licenses or
suffer criminal penalties. In the Agnew cases the licen~e fees
were not imposed solely for re"'enue purposes but as an inseparable part of a regulatory scheme excluded by state law.
(See also Agnew v. City of Los Anaelrs, 110 Cal.App.2d 612,
619-623 [243 P.2d 73] ; Lynch v. City of Los Angeles, 114
Cal.App.2d 115, 118-120 [249 P.2<l 856] ; Cify & County of
San Franci.~co v. Boss, 83 Ca1.App.2d 445,452 (189 P.2d 32].)
[3] In the present case, however, the city seeks to enforce
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its licensing ordinance against pctitioner for revenue only,
and as the Agncw cases expressly rccognized, such taxation
is not excluded because the state has occupied the field of
regulation. (51 Ca1.2d 1, 7 [330 P.2d 385] ; 51 Ca1.2d 474,
477 [334 P.2d 571]; 147 Cal.App.2d 144, 149 [304 P.2<l 788].)
[4] Petitioner contends, however, that by express provision the ordinance excludes criminal enforcement against
him. Section 2132.1 provides that "The criminal penalties
provided for by this Code shall not be applied to businesses
or professions requiring a State license as a condition precedent
to doing business in the City, nor as a method of obtaining
collection of the license fees." This provision was added to
the ordinance in 1959 following the decisions of this court in
the Agnew cases to make "it clear that the business fees imposed are for revenue only and clearly collectible within the
meaning of the decisions of the Supreme Court of this State."
(Palm Springs Ordinance No. 444.) Although section 2132.1
precludes the application of the criminal penalties provided
by the Palm Springs Ordinance Code, it does not make lawful
the carrying on of a business without a license, dispense with
the obligation to secure a license (Business License Ordinance,
§ 2111, sup"a), or exclude the application of the state criminal
penalty for carrying 011 a business without a license required
bylaw.
[ 5 J Section 16240 of the Business and Professions Code
provides that" Every person who commences or carries on any
business, trade, profession, or calling, for the transaction or
carrying on of which a license is required by any law of this
State, without taking out or procuring the license prescribed
by such la,v, is guilty of a midemeanor." The Legislature
added this section to the Business and Professions Code in
1941 at which time it repealed the identical provisions of
section 435 of the Penal Code. At that time it was settled that
a city ordinance was a law of this state within the meaning
of section 435. (Teachout v. Bogy, 175 Cal. 481, 484-485 [166
P. 319] ; Ex parte Bagshaw, 152 Cal. 701, 703 [93 P. 864] :
In re Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.App. 465,467; see also Oounty of
Plumas v. Wheeler, 149 Cal. 758, 768 rS7 P. 909] ; Ex parte
Stephen, 114 Cal. 278, 282 [46 P. 86].) By transferring the
statute from the Penal Code to the Business and Professions
Code the Legislature did not change the meaning of its terms.
(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 2.)
[6 J Petitioner was charged with the misdemeanor of
operating his business" without having first secured a business
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license as requireu by Section 2111 of Division 2 of the 'Palm
Springs Ordinance Coue.' " These allegations state the precise
facts madc a misdemeanor by section 16240 of the Business
and Professions Code. Petitioner was therefore fully informeu
of the charges against him and iu no way prejudiced by the
failure of the complaint to cite section 16240. Under these
circumstances failure to cite this section in the complaint is
not grounds for setting aside the judgment on habeas corpus.
As stated in In re Mingo, 190 Cal. 769, 7il [214 P. 850], "The
mere fact that the complaint alleged a violation of the county
ordinance instead of the state law' would not render the judgment void in so far as the facts alleged and proved showed a
violation of the state law.... " (See also In re 'J[urphy, 190
Cal. 286, 291-293 [212 P. 30] ; Ex parte Stephen, $Ilpra, 114
Cal. 278, 283; Ex parte Tay/or, 87 Cal. 91, 95 [25 P. 258] ;
In re Jingles, 27 Ca1.2d496, 499 [165 P.2d 12] ; III re Simmons,
199 CaL 590, 595 [250 P. 684] ; Olivieri v. Police Court of
Bakersfield, 62 Cal.App. 91, 94-95 [216 P. 44].)
[7] Petitioner contends that it is a denial of equal protection of the laws to enforce the criminal penalties of the city
ordinance against those not required to have state licenses but
not to enforce such penalties against those required to have
such licenses. The penalties of the ordinance have not been
invoked against petitioner in this case, however, and section
16240 of the Business and Professions Code, which he violated,
applies equally to all persons required to have licenses.
Since petitioner's attack on the judgment cannot prevail,
no purpose would be served by considering other questions
raised in the return to the order to show cause or the technical
objections to the form of the return raised in petitioner's
motion to strike it.
The motion to strike the return is denied. The order to show
cause is discharged, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus
is denied, and petitioner is remanded to custody.
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., White, J., and Dooling, J. pro tern.,·
concurred.
SCHAUEH, J., Dissenting.-I agree that under existing
law the city may properly impose a tax for revenue purposes
upon the business of petitioner. Such tax creates a civil debt
tiue from petitioner to the city. Whether the city may properly
enforce collection of that debt by penal sanction through an
• Assi~necl hy Chairman of Judicial Council.
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ordinance appropriate to that end is not an issue now before us.
I do 110t agrec that on thc record which is before us petitioner's conviction can bc sustained on the theoryinvokecl by
the majority. According to the petition and the rcturn the
charge on which petitioner was brought to trial is as follows:
"That the Crime of Misuemcanor, to-wit, Violation of Section
2111 of Division 2 of the 'Palm Springs Ordinance Code,' has
been committed by the above-named defendant as follows:
That said defendant on or about the 13th day of November,
1959, operated an ice crcam emporium known as the 'Pink
Palace,' at 182 South Indian Ave in the said City of Palm
Springs, without having first securcd a business license as
required by Section 2111 of Division 2 of the 'Palm Springs
Ordinance Code.' "
1\:[ere reading of the above quoted charge from the complaint
discloses that the only crime charged is "the Crime of Misdemeanor, to-wit, Violation of Section 2111 of Division 2 of
the 'Palm Springs Ordinance Code.'" But the majority,
while admitting as they must that section 2132.1 of the Palm
Springs Ordinance Code provides that "The criminal penalties provided for by this Code shall not be applied to businesses •.. requiring a State license . . . nor as a method
of obtaining collection of the license fees," seek to circumvent the city's proscription of penal sanction by invoking
section 16240 of the state's Business and Professions Code.
That state la,v provides that "Every person who commences
or carries on any business . . . for the transaction or carrying
on of which a license is required by any law of this State,
without ..• procuring the license prescribed by such law, is
guilty of a misdemeanor."
To support this ingenious theory the majority say that" A
city ordinance is a 'law of this State' within the meaning of
this section" and remand petitioner to custody.
Two obstacles preclude my concurrence: 1. As hereinabove
shown the petitioner has been charged solely with "Violation
of Section 2111 of Division 2 of the' Palm Springs Ordinance
Code' " and he has never (at least not in any relevant proceeding) been charged with, or brought to trial for, violation
of Business and Professions Code, section 16240.
2. Whether petitioner could, on the facts shown by the
petition and return, be successfully charged with, tried on,
and convicted for, violation of Business and Professions Code,
section 16240, is something which probably no court should
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assume to determine without the full procedures essential to
a fair trial on sudl charge ha .... ing been had. In auy event it
appears here that petitioner will be denied due process if he
is remanded on the theory of the majority.
In the petition it is alleged, and in the return is 110t denied,
"That this petitioner is licensed by the State of California,
Department of Agrieulture as a manufacturer of ice cream
produces, License No. 13086, Factory No. 4825, File No. 447861
18 Ll\fA. That the factory premises are at the complained of
place of business at 182 South Indian Avenue in the City of
Palm Springs, California." Petitioner further alleges "that
he is under the rule of Agllew vs. Culre)" City, asset forth in
the original Petition herein, so that he is being depri ....ed of his
property without 'due process of law,' as set forth hereinabove" and "that he is duly licensed by the State of California, Department of Agriculture under Code 661,' as a licensed manufacturer and purveyor of milk and ice cream
products. "
Examination of California's state Agricultural Code, Division IV, discloses an elaborate and detailed code of laws governing the production, processing, manufacturing and marketing of "Milk and Dairy Products," whieh encom!Jasses the
business petitioner commenced in Palm Springs. The state
code requires, among other things, the procurement of licenses
or permits for various operations including the business in
which petitioner was engaged, and prescribes penalties for
violations of the requirements. Likewise, examination of the
Business and Professions Code reveals more than 16 pages of
index devoted to the one word" Licenses" in relation to "any
business, trade, profession, or calling, for the transaction or
carrying on of which a license is required by any law of this
State," and in respect to which section 16240 provides that
"Every person who commences or carries on any [such
activity] . . . without taking out or procuring the license
prescribed by suck law, is guilty of a misdemeanor." (Italics
added.) Petitioner's undenied possession of the above described "license prescribed by such law" would appear to
constitute a prima facie (if not conclusi ....e) defense to a charge
of violating "such law."
If it is not altogether clear that section 16240 in its use of
the words i'required by any law of this State" means just
what it says-a law of this state and not an ordinance of a
city-the question is at least substantial enough to entitle a
defendant to a hearing and a fair trial Oil a pleading charging
Me.3d'"
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him with violation or the idl'utifielllaw before convicting and
remanding him.
In l"Ollllectioll with the proper construction of section 16240
it of course should be notcd that such section appears in
chapter 3, part 1, division VII of the Business and Professions Code. Chapter 3 includes the subheadings of "Definitions" (art. 1), "Actions" (art. 2) and "Penaltics" (art. 3).
Reference to articles 1 and 2 shows that they are concerned
exclusiYely with state and not county or city laws. For
example, section 16204 declares that" 'Officer' includes director, chief, commissioner, chairman, department, division,
bureau, commission, board and any other person, officer or
employee, and any agency, of or in the Government of this
State." (Consistently, if the majoritY'8 view is correct, the
above quoted language should be deemed to include "mayor,
councilman, city police officer, city treasurer," etc.) Section
16201 says that" 'Fee' includes every tax, fee, pell<Ilty and
other monetary exaction, and interest and costs in connection
therewith, imposed or collected in connection with or as a
prerequisite to or condition for the issuance, renewal or continued validity of any license, certificate or registration required by law." (Italics added; presumably, by the majority's view the word" fee" should be understood to include
the Palm Springs city license fee.) Section 16224 provides
that" All sums collected in suits under this chapter shall be
reported to the Controller and deposited in the State Treasury
to the credit of the fund in which would be deposited the fee,
tax or charge for which the suit was brought." If Palm
Springs can rely on Business and Professions Code, section
16240, for collection of the "license" fee imposed by its ordinance or a "penalty" imposed by state law then it would
seem to follow that such fee or penalty when collected should
be paid over, not to the treasurer of Palm Springs, but to the
State Treasury of California.
Regardless of any such problem as is last above mentioned
it appears more reasonable to me to construe the language of
section 16240 in the light of its context in chapter 3 of the
Business and Professions Code (hereinabove described and
quoted in part) and to relate its reaeh to the enforcement of
state laws which it purports to cont('mplate rather than to
city ordinances enacted exclusively for revenue purposes of
the city and concerning which the city's code expressly declares that" The crim inal penalties provided for by this Code
shall not be applied . . . as a method of obtaining collection
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of the licellse fees." It is, of eourse, our (lllt,\", w111>;'e the
applieable law is UllC'erlain, to resoh'e ally u!lcertainty in
favor of the accuscd person. (In I'C Tartar (19:j9). 52 Ca1.2d
250, 256-~:H [9, 10] [339 P.~d 553] ; Chessman \'. SlIperior
COll1't (1958),50 Ca1.2d 83:1, 843 [6J [330 P.2tl 22;)1; l'eople
v. Cal'skaddon (1957),49 Cal.2d 42:1.427 [6] [:318 P.2t1 4];
People v. Stuart (1936), 47 Cal.~d 167, 173 [7] [302 P.2d
5,55 A.L.H.2d 703] ; Peoplc Y. Smith \1933),44 Ca1.2d 77, 79
[2] [279 P.2d 33]; In I'C Brall!bie (1047), 31 Ca1.2tl 43, 51
[6, 7] [187 P.2el 411] ; III rc JleViekcrs (1046), ~9 Ca1.2d
264,278 [176 P.2d 40] ; People Y. Yalc1/fi~lc (1!l4G), 28 Ca1.2d
121,143 [20] [169 P.2d 1]; People Y. Ralph (1944),24 Cal.
2d 575, 581 [2] [130 P.2d 401] ; Ex parte Ros()l7Icilll (1890),
83 Cal. 388, 3n [23 P. 372].)
For the reaSOllS hereinabove related I dissent from the majority holding, aJ1l1 if ther~ be no tenable basis for sustaining
the conviction of petitioner (\\'hieh i<:sue, as indicated at the
outset of this dis<:cnt, I do not rrach but as to which the majority have failed to find a supportable theory) the writ should
be granted.
McComh, J., concurred.
Petitioner's appliration for a rehearing' was (lenirn. .Tllllr 8,
1960. Sl'llll.Uer, .T., and. MrComb, J., were of the opinion that
the application should be granted.

